Willing Buyer-Willing Seller: Failure or Scapegoat? 

‘Willing buyer, willing seller policy labelled a failure’, exclaimed The Namibian on its front page on Monday, 29 April.

Apart from some opposition politicians, it cites a respected local political commentator attributing the land reform problem “to the nature of the policy being based on willingness to buy or sell”.

If only it was so simple!
Few concepts have generated more public outrage and populist appeal than the willing buyer, willing seller (WB-WS) mechanism of acquiring land for redistribution.

It is a corollary of article 16 of the Constitution, which protects the right to private property.

Together with high land prices, many people regard it as the main cause of the slow pace of land redistribution.

Unsurprisingly, the first resolution passed at the Second National Land Conference in 2018 called for willing the buyer, willing seller policy to be abolished and for the government to explore alternative methods to speed up land reform.

The second resolution called on the government to strengthen coordination in the expropriation process and develop ‘stand-alone legislation on expropriation’.

This suggests many people regard expropriation, in particular ‘without compensation’, not only as an alternative land acquisition method, but as a panacea to speed up acquiring agricultural land, and to accelerate access to land by small-scale farmers.

FIGURATIVELY SPEAKING

It is concerning that those rejecting the WB-WS method have not produced empirical evidence to substantiate the assertion that it has failed to deliver land at a faster pace.

It should be remembered that 63% of commercial farmland offered to the government since the inception of the land redistribution programme to 2018 was given a waiver.

In its various incarnations, the Ministry of Land Reform bought only about 3 million hectares of land for resettlement – out of a total of approximately 8 million ha offered – between 1992 and 2018.

It gave waivers for 5 million hectares.

These are figures produced by the Namibia Statistics Agency in 2018. There can be no doubt, therefore, that there has always been much more commercial farmland on the market than the government was willing or able to acquire.

Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the reasons for the slow pace of land delivery lie elsewhere.

POLITICAL WILL AND THE ELITE

The root problem is the lack of political will to make a success of land redistribution.

This is evident, for example, in the fact that the pace of land acquisition during the five-year period following the 2018 Land Conference has slowed to an average of 68 008 ha a year, compared to the average of 177 762 ha a year for the period 1992-2018.

A similar lack of action can be observed in implementing the recommendations of the Commission of Ancestral Land Rights.

The lack of political will also manifests itself in a ministry that, since its inception, has not appeared to have had the human and financial resources to efficiently process land acquisition and allocation.

This may be why the ministry repeatedly returned funds to the Treasury.

It also seems unable to provide post-settlement support to resettled farmers.

In his compliance report for 2018-2022, the auditor general found that while the department of land reform targeted assisting 73% of resettled farmers with infrastructure and support services, nothing was done during the period under review.

Another indication of the lack of political will is that the budget for land acquisition has been halved to N$50 million in the current budget framework.

These few examples suggest there must be reasons other than WS-WB for the slow pace of land redistribution.

Focusing on this diverts public attention from serious political and resource problems in the land reform programme
Shifting the blame for poor implementation and lack of political will to predominantly white farm-owners is easier than confronting the vested interests of a political elite which has instrumentalised land reform to buttress political patronage.

PRICE PRESSURES

Inflated land prices have been identified as another reason for slow land acquisition.

Unlike the WB-WS case, we have at least one analysis of land prices – carried out by the FAO in 2011-2012.

Regrettably, this report fell into oblivion and was never discussed publicly with a view to amending the land acquisition policy.

Among many findings, it stated that in arriving at a farm’s estimated value, government valuers and estate agents compared the offer to prices previously paid by the government (comparison method of valuation) and argued that ‘valuations are making the market rather than following it’.

They suggested a ‘fair value basis for valuation be considered’ which might involve considering matters disregarded in the market value assessment.

This may include the productive value of the farm, for example.

It also found that implementing the ‘preferent right’ to buy land in 1995 – which required farm owners to first offer their land to the government before selling it privately – pushed up land prices.

It was suggested that the ‘preferent right’ be replaced with the ‘right of first refusal’.

The fundamental difference between these two approaches is that under a right of first refusal, buyers and sellers negotiate a price for a farm.

The seller is then required to offer the farm to the state at the same price negotiated with a private buyer.

The state has the right to refuse or accept the offer. This is likely to bring land prices closer to prevailing market prices.

NEW MODELS ARE NEEDED

To believe expropriation with or without compensation is a panacea for solving our problems is simply naïve.

Apart from an array of negative financial and other implications, additional land acquired in this way needs to be administered properly and beneficiaries provided with appropriate support.

Unless human and financial resources are increased dramatically, the responsible ministry will be hard pressed to do this.

However, this requires political will and evidence-based policies.

Instead of regurgitating empty slogans, political leaders and civil society organisations should develop and present new models for land reform.

• * Wolfgang Werner is an independent consultant and former associate professor in the department of land and property sciences at Nust.