Africa, Security Council Reform And The Ezulwini Consensus

NEW York was, over the past two weeks, the seat of frantic diplomatic grandstanding and oration during the general debate of the 62nd session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The UN has had its critics from the beginning, though the voices have become more clamorous in recent years, attacking the bureaucracy, corruption and waste, and a general perceived lack of capability to deal with conflicts which erupted since the end of the Cold War. Failure to effectively address these challenges undermines its reputation.But the reform of the UN Security Council has possibly become the most crucial issue to dominate diplomatic talks about the UN.This discussion has produced a set of proposals on institutional change, and also the strengthening of the normative framework of the UN.Predictably, at the 62nd session, a horde of African leaders, from South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki to Nigeria’s Yaradua, both contenders for an African seat in an expanded Security Council, raised the contentious issue of the Security Council reform in line with the ambitious Ezulwini Consensus (calling for two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats) and the Sirte Declaration.In his speech to the 62nd session, President Mbeki captures the Ezulwini Consensus convincingly when he says: “Although the concepts of freedom and equality are universal and fully embraced by the United Nations, this global organization has not itself transformed and designed the necessary institutions of governance consistent with the noble ideals that drive modern democratic societies.”This argument is relevant for three overarching reasons.First, the Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations, perhaps the most prestigious.Second, primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred in accordance with the charter (ironically by the membership of the United Nations) to the Security Council.Thus, it is an injustice that Africa is excluded from a forum where 70 per cent of the discussions deal with its fate.Third, as a block, Africa represents possibly the biggest part of UN membership.These combined with the salient argument that Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat in the Security Council.This very same point was underscored compellingly by Namibia’s Foreign Minister Marco Hausiku at the 62nd session.As Africans, there is a moral and political obligation to support the expansion of the Security Council in favour of an African seat(s).But the dilemma lurking behind this issue is not that we should not support it as Africans, but it is the kind of philosophical abstractions it imposes or conceals in the discussion about power in Africa’s international relations.Additionally, it also induces a practical obligation on Africa’s ‘small states’ to argue Africa’s case for an expanded Security Council.However, it is doubtful if some of these arguments would in essence satisfy our elementary assumptions as to why reform would lead to a just global order or an equitable distribution of power.In their current form, these arguments mostly gravitate around the concept of power and the democratisation of international relations.Referring to the UN, President Mbeki’s asserts: “Because the nations of the world are defined by the dominant and the dominated, the dominant will also become the decision-makers in the important global forums.”There is a noticeable paradox in this argument.Even if the Ezulzwini Consensus is about geography per se, the main determinant in which an African state could get a Security Council seat would be the political economy of Africa’s international relations.An African seat in an expanded Security Council would certainly go to South Africa or Nigeria, and/or Egypt.These countries have so much in common in that they are the dominant countries in Africa, and global middle-powers in terms of geo-economics and politics.Therefore, African thinking on the expansion of the Security Council might seek to decompose power as a primordial construct in international relations, yet it does not go far in providing an alternative to the centrality of power and national interest in foreign policy.It actually perpetuates the existing unequal distribution of power, albeit in a different form.I am aware that membership of the Security Council imposes huge financial obligations; financing peacekeeping missions, taking the lead in conflict resolution and management.But the questions that would merit deeper reflection would be: to what extent is South Africa or Egypt’s national interest the same as that of Namibia or Benin? The Security Council is ontologically state-based.Is political economy a sufficient condition to determine which African country gets a UNSC seat? If powerful African states join the Security Council, would they not inadvertently or voluntarily become part of the dominant, and the ‘small states’ will be the ‘dominated’? For Africa to meaningfully speak of an equitable Security Council or world order and for ‘global democracy’ not to be for the dominant and the powerful, ‘small states’ should be part of the running equation in the debate about an African seat in the Security Council.* Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari is a PhD fellow in political science at the University of Paris- Panthéon Sorbonne, France.He is currently on a research internship at the UN Headquarters.Failure to effectively address these challenges undermines its reputation.But the reform of the UN Security Council has possibly become the most crucial issue to dominate diplomatic talks about the UN.This discussion has produced a set of proposals on institutional change, and also the strengthening of the normative framework of the UN.Predictably, at the 62nd session, a horde of African leaders, from South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki to Nigeria’s Yaradua, both contenders for an African seat in an expanded Security Council, raised the contentious issue of the Security Council reform in line with the ambitious Ezulwini Consensus (calling for two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats) and the Sirte Declaration.In his speech to the 62nd session, President Mbeki captures the Ezulwini Consensus convincingly when he says: “Although the concepts of freedom and equality are universal and fully embraced by the United Nations, this global organization has not itself transformed and designed the necessary institutions of governance consistent with the noble ideals that drive modern democratic societies.”This argument is relevant for three overarching reasons.First, the Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations, perhaps the most prestigious.Second, primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred in accordance with the charter (ironically by the membership of the United Nations) to the Security Council.Thus, it is an injustice that Africa is excluded from a forum where 70 per cent of the discussions deal with its fate.Third, as a block, Africa represents possibly the biggest part of UN membership.These combined with the salient argument that Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat in the Security Council.This very same point was underscored compellingly by Namibia’s Foreign Minister Marco Hausiku at the 62nd session.As Africans, there is a moral and political obligation to support the expansion of the Security Council in favour of an African seat(s).But the dilemma lurking behind this issue is not that we should not support it as Africans, but it is the kind of philosophical abstractions it imposes or conceals in the discussion about power in Africa’s international relations.Additionally, it also induces a practical obligation on Africa’s ‘small states’ to argue Africa’s case for an expanded Security Council.However, it is doubtful if some of these arguments would in essence satisfy our elementary assumptions as to why reform would lead to a just global order or an equitable distribution of power.In their current form, these arguments mostly gravitate around the concept of power and the democratisation of international relations.Referring to the UN, President Mbeki’s asserts: “Because the nations of the world are defined by the dominant and the dominated, the dominant will also become the decision-makers in the important global forums.”There is a noticeable paradox in this argument.Even if the Ezulzwini Consensus is about geography per se, the main determinant in which an African state could get a Security Council seat would be the political economy of Africa’s international relations.An African seat in an expanded Security Council would certainly go to South Africa or Nigeria, and/or Egypt.These countries have so much in common in that they are the dominant countries in Africa, and global middle-powers in terms of geo-economics and politics.Therefore, African thinking on the expansion of the Security Council might seek to decompose power as a primordial construct in international relations, yet it does not go far in providing an alternative to the centrality of power and national interest in foreign policy.It actually perpetuates the existing unequal distribution of power, albeit in a different form.I am aware that membership of the Security Council imposes huge financial obligations; financing peacekeeping missions, taking the lead in conflict resolution and management.But the questions that would merit deeper reflection would be: to what extent is South Africa or Egypt’s national interest the same as that of Namibia or Benin? The Security Council is ontologically state-based.Is political economy a sufficient condition to determine which African country gets a UNSC seat? If powerful African states join the Security Council, would they not inadvertently or voluntarily become part of the dominant, and the ‘small states’ will be the ‘dominated’? For Africa to meaningfully speak of an equitable Security Council or world order and for ‘global democracy’ not to be for the dominant and the powerful, ‘small states’ should be part of the running equation in the debate about an African seat in the Security Council. * Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari is a PhD fellow in political science at the University of Paris- Panthéon Sorbonne, France.He is currently on a research internship at the UN Headquarters.